Arthur B. Darling Interviews:

MONTAGUE, Ludwell L.

PFORZHEIMER, Walter L. ---

(3)

REBER, James Q.

REEVES, J. B. L.

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Montague, L. L. Interviews and Conversations

He came to the Central Intelligence Group at its beginning from McCormack's staff in the State Department. Contague had been Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Cormittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then representative of "G-2" among the senior members of the Joint Intelligence Staff. It was there in December 1914 that he took significant part with Lay, Gleason, and others in preparing the two plans for the Joint Intelligence Committee. Under Admiral Souers as the first Director of Central Intelligence Hontague assisted in drafting the first directives of the Mational Intelligence Authority and became head of the Central Reports Staff. It was he who set up the Office of Research and Evaluation for General Vandenberg and produced "OHE-1." Then as head of the Global Survey Group Montague was most active in the Office of Reports and Estimates and went from it to the Mational Estimates Board in the new Office of National Estimates.

February 15, 1952

before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Montague remembered that the opposition to Donovan's plan came from both personal animus and institutional bias. These seemed to be the chief elements in the opposition. On their merits, however, three other arguments

The Donovan Plan

entered the controversy. One was that the central organization



should not have separate collection. Another was that the organization should not engage in subversive practices with its collection and analysis of intelligence. The third was that the Director should not be immediately responsible to the President. It of course was Donovan's firm conviction that the Director should not be separated from the President by any board or committee.

Nembers of the Joint Intelligence Staff were dissatis-

Discussion in the Joint Intelligence Staff fied with the Joint Intelligence Committee as an estimating board. They discussed the matter among themselves frequently and finally decided to put their ideas on paper. It appears that James S. Lay, Jr established the definitions in what became known as JIS 89. Then Max Ways, representative of the Foreign Economic Administration, and Everett Gleason, representative of "OSS," drafted the principles of what became known as the "civilian plan." Gleason sent a memorandum of it to Donovan. Montague himself, as General "Bissell's representative on the Staff, was obliged by his position to work out a plan for the Armed Services. Apparently his heart was not in it and subsequent events allowed him to join with the others in supporting a modified form of the "civilian plan."

The 121st Meeting The famous 121st meeting of the Joint Intelligence

Committee on December 22, 1944 was necessary to show to the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the chiefs of intelligence from the respective services, the difficulties which the Joint Intelligence Staff was having with the problem of central




General Gissell intelligence. General Bissell was not convinced after all had been said in that meeting. But it seems likely that he understood what was happening for he instructed Bontague to help the others purfect their plan. Result in short order was what became known as JIC 239/5, the plan for a central intelligence organization which went eventually to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then reappeared in the fall of 1945 as the Office of Strategic Services came to its end.

The IRea of the Board I asked Montague who it was that had the original idea of making the Secretaries of the Departments serve as a board of authority. He did not remember that any one person came up with the original idea. His hypothesis was that they all were representatives of some Department or agency. That was the nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was the federal principle. As a practical matter, of course, no one wanted a single Department to monopolize, and so all of them thought it logical for them to cooperate as a "whole."

Defense
of the
Joint
Intelligence
Coffaittee's
Lotimating

Montague defended the Joint Intelligence Committee as an estimating board. Resides the Armed Services, the Department of State, the Federal Economic Administration, and the Office of Strategic Services had representation in the Committee. Estimating was its function during the war and military estimating under such conditions was relatively easy. Political matters caused "split papers." Unanimity was not the "rule" for the Committee's procedure. But the Joint Chiefs, said Montague, did not like to have



split papers come up to them. The effort therefore seems to have been to reduce dissents to the minimum. He thought of the situation as requiring control by a majority. He understood, however, that the hope was to obtain eventually unanimous opinions.

February 29, 1952

Intelligence Committee to bring the Research and Analysis Branch

of "OSS" into close relation with "G-2" and "ONI." Montague could

not recall much of the Warner plan but he did remember that there

(G-2) had never considered the plan seriously. Montague had just

was a committee of some sort in the fall of 1942 and that it

about the so-called Warner plan for reorganizing the Joint

I called Montague on the telephone today to inquire

The Warner Plan

worked into the following spring. I had talked with Mr. Suford in the State Department on the preceding day. Buford could not recall detail but he remembered, he thought, that General Strong

Din ecollections

Intelligence Cormittee during the war. Fortier also recalled that \(\sum_{\text{C}} \) G-2 did not think much of "R & A." Fortier, however, said that \(\text{L}/2\) his recollection was quite dim. I gathered from these remarks of all three that "R & A" had the reputation of not being worth much, certainly not enough for the Army and Navy to want to take it over. \(\int \text{As} \) I look this interview over for inclusion in the Historical Collection I recall that General Magnuder had a different view of the Warner plan. See Chapter I, pages 23-25, and his interview of November 18, 1952.7

April 1, 1952

This conference was concerned for the most par

Cited Darling (2), 10/44;

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Failure of mortionment Tenorts Staff. I showed Montague the first roster of the Staff. This recalled for him the difficulty which he had in apportioning his personnel among the several Services as required by the concept of the Group. The problem was too intricate and time-wasting. Moreover, after delay almost beyond endurance he could not have

Personnel

Moreover, after delay almost beyond endurance he could not have often the right people of the right place. However good in the-cry, the idea of apportionment among the Services and requisition for the Group was mistaken. Montague's experience was an argument that the agency should have the right to "hire and fire" which Vandenberg demanted when he came to office as the second Director of Central Intelligence.

Souers' Council in the Group I asked Montague then about the Council of the Group.

He said that there had been nothing like it in the Agency

since that time. Admiral Souers had wished that his Assistant

Directors should become a real council. He presented matters of

policy for their deliberation. Today, said Montague, although

there are regular meetings of the Assistant Directors there is no


such use of them as Souers intended. Mandenberg brought his

"kitchen cabinet" with him. These officers gave him advice. He

did not consult his Assistant Directors of the purpose.

Wandenberg':
"Kitchen
'Cabinet"

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
Facilities for Subversion The chief of operational services. Montague replied that until "SSU" was turned over to the Group by Magruder, Colonel Fortier did not have much of a job, and then when Mandenberg arrived with his own staff, Fortier did not remain much longer in the Group. I further impaired if much of the personnel and facilities for subversive activities had been brought over to the Group from "OSS" by way of the Strategic Services Unit. Hontague did not know. If there was an attempt to propertuate those functions of "OSS" it was kept very secret.


I asked what were the functions of Colonal Fortier as

Plan
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ntral Reports
Staff

Estimating

he Procedure in Intelligence Advisory Board designate one of his staff as an assistant to the head of the Central Reports Staff to serve with him "full time" in making reports and estimates. The assistant to the head of CRS would still be responsible to the member of the Intelligence Wivisory Foard, not to the Director of Central Intelligence. Hontague said that it was his own proposal from his apportance in a similar situation as a member of the Joint Intelligence Staff under the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Today in "ONE," they do not have such permanent interdepartmental numbership but these fellows who come from the Army, Navy and State Department sit in task forces of "CCE" and discuss the construction of Pational Intelligence Estimates. Each reports then to someone higher up in his own organization who in turn reports to the chief of intelligence in






what service. These persons in between apparently make up their minds whether they should advise the chief of intelligence to concur or to discent. The chief himself has not been in the conference nor has the intermediary officer. The junior officers who come to "ONE" and participate in the discussions are simply carriers. It was Montague's opinion that it would be better to have the representatives of the "IAC" agencies on permanent and "full time" assignment to the Office of National Estimates. This was what he had in mind he said in the spring of 1946.

Our discussion had led Montague to remark somewhere along the way that in his opinion William H. Jackson has one of the loosest conceptions of what a national estimate is. There were about six different conceptions going the rounds. I have met four variations so far, Kent's, Houston's, Jackson's and Montague's. They all seem to vary primarily with respect to the meaning of "coordinate."

The administrative order of March 4, 1946 officially activating the Central Reports Staff simply caught up with Montague and his associates. They had been at work since approximately February 13. He had tried to produce an "estimate" immediately but, he said, it was hardly worth the name. It was little more than a daily report. His problem in those first weeks was to obtain personnel. He was not able really to set up his estimates branch before Souers left and Vandenberg arrived.

Loose Conceptions of National Estimates

No Estimating in "CRS"



Nontarue in

Tuddle and Tis Doputies

The Intelligence Staff

With the advent of Vandenberg and his plan for a large "CRO" Montague found himself, though still head of the "Reports Staff," subordinated to Mr. Muidle who was brought from the Department of State. The theory was that since the Department was a policy making body the head of the new Office of Restarch and Evaluation in the Group should be headed by a secuber of the State Department. Hontague himself had be note the Domartment, but for only a couple of months; worse jot, he had been a "Informack man." Montague's work in the Joint Intelligence Staff and before that " the Joint Intelligence Committee did not seem to have been considered adequate exercience for estillating, so I thou ht as I listened to this story. The fact was however that during the war real estimating had been done in the Joint Intelligence Committee. Montague's difficulty now was political; he was not enough of a "State man" so that he could be head of "ORL." He was too much of a "State man" to be deputy, and so a Captain McCollum came from the Mavy to be deputy to Mr. Huddle. But Huddle asked Montague to continue to do the work as his deputy in charge of estimating at the head of the Reports Staff now called the Intelligence Staff.

To show me how a bureaucracy works, Montague went on with evident amusement to say that subordinate personnel who had been very deferential to him when he was head of the Central Reports Staff and called Assistant Director now found him write inadequate in the very same job. Montague asked Mr. Huddle if he were still Huddle's deputy as he had said. The answer was yea.



Lenia we thun asked if Muddle had told arrone class becides bit self. Hu Wile said no. Why not, admed Hendarus? Because he did not want to cause trouble. I asked how longuar. Huddle styped in the Grow. He was there nearly a year and then went ove seas in some diplomatic post for the State Lepurtment. Then Dabbitt became head of "CE." Hontague, Yan Slyck, and others continued to function as the "Global Survey Group."

We turned then to a discussion of the British Joint Intelligence Committee. The accompanying paper is a copy of the memorandum which Montague made for Kent recently to distinguish the British Committee from the Central Intelligence Amency and also the Intelligence Advisory Cormittee.

As he was leaving Montague: let me take for my studies his "Souvenirs of JIC-CIG" and "Souvenirs of G/GS."

> Cited Jarling III April 11, 1952

The first topic of discussion today was the "Defense


Project" which Colonel Lovell started in the Pentagon during the spring of 1946 to provide as quickly as possible as much intelligence as could be obtained with regard to the Soviet Union. I asked Montague if Lovell's activity were encroaching upon the Central Reports Staff. Montague said no. The Staff was equipped only to do the "Daily Summary" at that time. Then we talked about his own difficulties with the Central Planning Staff which

International

Lovell's

Defense Project

Estimating



The Contral classing traff undertook to advise the Reports Staff upon its organization.

Tentague was inked then and doubtless still is but his recollection of the Central Reports Staff today is that when Vandenberg cause he decided to break up the Planning Staff. Its members were but up at "cuction." Hontague felt that the net result of the Planning Staff's effort had been nothing.

The Council

We referred again to the Council. Sours turned it over to Douglass and absented himself from its meetings most of the time.

Donald Edgar, who became the head of Vandenberg's

Idear "ICipe" Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, said Montague, came to the Group as the "personal representative" of the Secretary of State. This was the impression at least which Edgar gave to Montague and others in the Group. Edgar proceeded at once to build "ICAPS" into an even more active institution within the Group than the Central Planning Staff had been.

April 18, 1952

"MIA 1"
Capabilities
and
Inkentions

I had just come upon the fact that the clause in the draft of "NIA 1" regarding the capabilities and intentions of the United States (Article 7) had been left out of the directive in its final form. Knowing that Montague was one of those who had framed the directive I therefore asked him why it was that Lay and he and Souers had done so. Montague's reply was that probably they were "shooting for the moon"when they included the provision



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
> Defeat by the Goard

the draft. The hope was that they might be able to persuade the departmental chiefs of intelligence and the Secretaries to accept the provision. They had included the provision because as members of the Joint Intelligence Staff and the Joint Intelligence Committee during the war they were experienced in trying to make estimates. They knew that they could hardly estimate with regard to the enemy's intentions without knowing something about the abilities of their own country and its intentions. Montague recalled that Souers was extremely sensitive to opposition in the Armed Services and rightly so, said Montague. Possibly when Souers got wind of the possibility that there might be opposition to the clause he withdrew it without any further comment. According to Montague the slightest breath of opposition might have overturned the Group at the moment. Anyway, the clause did not survive the first draft.

Hay 22, 1952

Montague was on active duty in the Pentagon and so I had to call him Colonel on the telephone. I asked him about administrative order No. 32 dated November 1st, 1946. As I first read it, it seemed to me that his plan for a "chief and four assistants" had got through the Intelligence Advisory Board's meeting on October 31st, 1946. Montague disillusioned me. As approved by the Advisory Board the administrative order was a joke. It provided that "full time" representatives might be designated by the respective members of the Advisory Board. Their work was





optional on their part. It was "ORE" which had to conform. The outcome was as he has emplained in his "Souvenirs" as of April 13, 1947, that there was no coordinated estimating worth the name.

June 12, 1952 Cited Barling 11/4"

Today Montague gave me a criticism of my preliminary writing in Chapter IV, Section 3, on Research and Estimates. It was to be made clear that Secretary Byrnes was not forcing the appointment of Mr. Huddle. Vandenberg had recommended Montague for the position. Colonel Wright proposed that a Foreign Service Officer come from the Department of State to direct the enlarged program in research and evaluation which they had in mind. After the appointment of Huddle, of course, his deputy had to come from some other Department. So, Montague became chief of the Intelli-

There was no personal issue between Admiral Inglis and Montague over "ORE 1." Montague agreed that the estimate had not been coordinated in accordance with the proper meaning of that word. He had the benefit of materials from other sources and the criticism of other persons also. But the estimate was essentially the product of one man's efforts. None of the departmental chiefs of intelligence had actually participated in making it.

In regard to the directive which came to Montague as Acting Head of "ORR" from Vandenberg's Executive by way of Edgar, Chief of "ICAPS," Montague stated that "ORR" had neither the persons nor the files necessary for evaluating the materials from the

Vandenberg

bright

Huddle


gence Staff.

"OFE 1"

Inglis and Montague

evaluation of Matrials

from "OSO"



Daone : 15 Order

Office of Special Operations and yet Colonel Dabney issued an order to "O.T." Theretofore "G-2" had been evaluating or grading this material from covert sources. But "G-2" had requested that it be relieved of the work. It was not a question of reluctance at all on the part of "OPE." The Office simply was not sumipped for the work at that time.

"OHL " not Equipped

September 22, 1952

The story from Admiral Foskett on Hillenkoetter's

X

V

Gossin about llunkoettoris ppointment

appointment was a bit of gossip from the Services. It was to the effect that the position of Director of Central Intelligence was

open only "to an Admiral" as General Wandenberg left. The meaning

The State

Department's Turn

should have it rather than the Department of State because it Was the only high position left in Washin-ton to which a man from the

Services could go without losing his perquisites. It seemed triv-

ial out it threw some light on the persistent efforts to make sure

that the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence under the

of it was that since the Army had enjoyed the position the Navy

Mational Security Act should have safeguards for men from the

then either be dismissed or returned to active duty. I asked if

Army, the Navy or the Air Force who might take the position and


the State Department had made any effort to acquire the position. It was in a sense the State Department's turn. Hontague replied

that there had been a comment emanating from the Department of

State. Bulord had called him to talk about the possibility of naming Allen C. Dulles, not a member of the State Department to be

for Dulles

The Novemint



sure, but as a ranking civilian. Hontague told suford that they were too late. He had seen the news from Paris in the "cable traffic"; Hillsnkoetter had been assigned the job and he was endeavoring to avoid having to accept it.


llenkoetter too Available

> Denuty in the Staff of the

Council

Oelegation Of. Decision

Our talk centered upon Admiral Hillankostter's work as Director of Central Intelligence. Hontague resembered that Hillenkoetter was accessible to his staff. Anybody could get into his office when necessary. In fact, said Montague, Millenhestter was almost too available. Montague spoke of his own experience as the representative of CIA on the Staff of the National Security Council. The Director had that position as "liaigon" with the Council but he could send a deputy. Pecause Hontarus had so much experience with central intelligence from the time when he had been Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee through the time when he had assisted Admiral Sours in organizing the Central Intelligence Group, he was the natural choice for Millenkoctter's deputy on the Staff of the Mational Security Council. When he was handling "estimates," said Montague, he was allowed to empress ominions for the Agency from the moint of view of "ORE." But when he came to other matters he did not feel that he should enack unless he had been specifically instructed by the Director. Go Hontague went to Hillenkoetter of ten with requests for such directions and received clanket authority to co ahead. Hillenhootter would remark, "Thatever you say I will support." This, of course, said Montague, was yielding his authority as Director and in a way



which Montague thought Hillenkoetter should not have done. He should not delegate his own decisions.

On matters of "coordinated intelligence estimates,"

Admiral Millenkoetter knew very little and accordingly took little
if any part in the actual construction of the estimates. But with
regard to matters which came over the cables from Europe, said
Montague, Hillenkoetter was unusually studious. He seemed to nore
over the cables and he was always able to answer specific overtions. As Montague spoke of this, and of this trait as if
Hillenkoetter were the President's personal intelligence agent, I
recalled Admiral Leahy's opinion of Hillenkoetter as a nost skillful collector of secret intelligence.

In regard to the Intelligence Advisory Committee
Montague had what seemed to me the usual remarks to make.
Hillenkoetter had missed an opportunity to maintain the position which Vandenoers had established. Montague was certain that
Hillenkoetter had done so in order to reduce the temmers in the
Committee. I remarked that under Section 303 in the Act of 1947
Willenkoetter seemed to be in position to have an Advisory
Committee or not as he pleased. But apparently he had been
stopped by the Secretaries in the National Security Council
itself, as was their legal right. Montague felt however that
Hillenkoetter might have dealt in a more forceful manner even with
the Counsel which he was obliged to have. Montague spoke of one
meeting of the "IAC" when he was present. Willenkoetter stated

and Estimates

illankoettar

Knowledge of Secret Intelligence

Hillenkoetter and Tempers in the

idvisory Board

Stubborn and Silent



his position and then maintained a rather stubborn and silent attitude. The result was that one after another of those present tried to start some discussion and could not make it go.

Then we talked about the revision of "MSCID 1" in July 1949. It made Hillenkoetter chairman as well as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Montague pointed cut that in theory this was a setback for Hillenkoetter. As a member and chairman of the Committee, the Director was only one of the Group rather than the superior who could call upon the representative members of the committee for advice as he saw fit.

October 30, 1952

Our discussion today was in connection with Montague's criticism of paragraphs in Chapter VI, Section V, on the "Joint Chiefs and Civilians." He remarked that the military men considered the Central Intelligence Group as if it had inherited the role of "R & A" from the old Office of Strategic Services. Contributions from the Group were to be used by the Joint Intelligence Committee about as it pleased. The Group was a "servant" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the days of the war, of course, "OSS" was directly under the orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


Montague emplained to me the organization of the Joint Intelligence Group within the Joint Staff under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Intelligence Group, he said, had "no mind of its own." It was composed of men from the respective Services but

hairnanship of the Committee

The Attitude of Wilitary Men

The Group as Servant

The Joint ntelligence Oroup



others in those Services knew that they could go directly past the men in the Group to their respective chiefs of intelligence. He said also that the Services seemed to be as jealous of "JIO" as they were of "CIA."

Civilian
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Joint
Intelligence
Committee


We talked then of Hillenkoetter's effort to maintain representation for the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission in the Joint Intelligence Committee, even if he were to take an inferior position for himself personally. It was clear to Montague that if he had done so Hillenkoetter would have gone right to the old position of "OSS." Hillenkoetter would have sat at the "foot of the table." He would not have been the Coordinator but again a "servant."

General
Gruenther's
Words
and
Thoughts

I asked what seemed to be in General Gruenther's mind when he spoke of certain documents belonging to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as not available to the Central Intelligence agency.

Montague's answer was that the papers of the Joint Intelligence

Committee were documents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They could be considered as unfinished materials which could not be released without the consent of the Joint Chiefs. He said also that possibly Gruenther was talking about a different kind of intelligence which might be named "information from abroad." Just what the difference was between foreign intelligence and such information I could not discern.



Movember 6, 1952

I called Montague on the telephone with regard to statements in the McMarney Report (MSC 50). The Dulles Committee had concluded that the Director of Central Intelligence should bring the Intelligence Advisory Committee more actively into coordinating intelligence activities and approving intelligence estimates, and that the members of the Advisory Committee should be collectively responsible. The resulting estimates therefore would be "coordinated national estimates." I asked Montague if I might say that the concept of the Advisory Committee was undergoing change in 1949. Originally, I thought that the concept (MIA 1) had been that the Advisory Board was to act in that capacity on matters generally as the Director of Central Intelligence needed advice. It seemed to me that few if any thought at that time of national estimating as it is being done today.

Montague corrected me. The original concept of "JIC" in wartime, he said, was one of coordination and that concept was in Souers' mind when they drafted NIA 1 in February, 19h6. I recalled that he as chief of the Reports Staff wished to establish an estimating branch. He elaborated the point that he had expected its estimates to be finished or practically so at the working level. Then those estimates would go up to the Intelligence Advisory Board and there the chiefs of intelligence constituting it might offer objections. But the expectation was that the chiefs usually would accept an estimate because their own

The Original

Coordination in

Estimating


Concept.

The Dulles

and Nollarnet

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Expectations of the entral Reports Staff



Response of the Departmental Codefs

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stantial dissents.

representatives had worked upon it at the lower level with the chief of the Reports Staff. Montague said that the Director was to be separate from his Advisory Board but that he would sit with them, as it were, like the British "King and Council." The Director would have "individual responsibility," possibly completely so. The members of the Advisory Board would offer sub-

isappearance of the iginal Concept

The Effect


of New Men under the National Security Act, said Montague, were unfamiliar with the original plans. Admiral Inglis was still on the Advisory Committee, and he remembered his objection to "ORD 1" in the fall of 1946. But new men were in charge during the Dulles and McNarney episodes. It is Montague's opinion that the original plan for "coordinated national estimates" disappeared. It was reappearing in 1949. He considered that the present concept of the Intelligence Advisory Committee as an estimating board with collective responsibility for approving all of the estimates made within the Agency had developed to its accepted position after

The men who took over the Agency and its reorganization

. General - Seith With this concept there had grown to full stature what had always been present in law, that is, acceptance of the Director of Central Intelligence as "King." General Smith sits with the Advisory Committee; he knows that he has to rely upon them for the resources of intelligence; he accepts their discussion and he may be influenced by it. But Smith can and he does from his own actimate. I wendered as I limbered to Hente mats

General Smith became Director of Central Intelligence.

. General . Seith as .ng in Council"



emplanation what Vandenberg would think of this development.

Probably he know very well that it was happening. See the interview with him regarding the responsibility of the Director, March 17, 1952.7

As we closed this discussion Montague tollux of the reluctance on the part of the representatives of the old Edvisory Board. They did not want to participate in estimating. They acked if they might not do so by mail. It was the Intelligence Advisory Board, he said, which dragged its feet in 1966 and 1957.

larch 23, 1953

cited Derlin

Menta we did not recall Hansen Baldwin's article of October 18, 1947. The illustrations indicated to him that he had never seen it. But the material in it, he said, was generally known and discussed within the Agency at that time. This was the article which Blum said had influenced him to suggest to Secretary Forrestal some investigation of the intelligence system.

Montague's memory of the events in the fall of 1947 is confined primarily to matters of ORE. Babbitt had taken charge in the summer. The controversies of the preceding year were continuing. Montague was in the Global Survey Groum, waiting for Pabbitt to solve the problems created by the chiefs of the Geographical Divisions, still led by Munter. According to Montague's memory, Babbitt was at a disadvantage because he had been considered for a position under Hunter in the Mestern Burope. Branch. Sunter had

opposed the appointment. I asked if Babbitt knew that Munter had


Baldwin's Article in October, 1947

Coordination

in Estimating by

Mail


Babbitt and Junter



opposed. Montague was quite sure that Babbitt did. Babbitt said nothing to me about it the other day when we talked over Eddy's interest in his appointment as Assistant Director of the Office of Reports and Estimates. In my opinion, Babbitt did not tell me because he did not wish to give the impression of being hostile to Hunter because Funter had opposed him.

This was not mere gossio. Babbitt's difficulties with the men around him contributed to his hesitancy to "get tough," as he said he should have done. Captain McCollum, naturally enough, was somewhat disappointed that he was not made Assistant Director when Huddle left. No doubt McCollum behaved properly, but the fact must have added to Babbitt's reluctance. Moreover, Babbitt was opposed in the Department of State which he was expected to represent in the Agency as Assistant Director of "ORE." It was more than a year before he got a higher rating from the State Department. In fact, if I recall, he did not receive the P-8 until after he had gone on the "payroll of the Agency." So, he came with a rating lower than several of the men who were under him in ORE. He certainly did not represent "G-2" even though he had spent some years in that service during the war. And finally, Eddy left the Department of State; the one who had sponsored Babbitt's appointment to the Agency was gond. It was not surprising that he had difficulty with both his subordinates and his own will nower.

Babbitt's Predicament



Jackson and Montarue discussing what was wrong in ONE with respect to estimating, coordinating, research and evaluation, and the familiar problems. Contague recalled the chief difficulty as one of personnel. If th man had been able to get along with one another and "cooperate," he said, almost any system could have been made to work well enough.

Montague spent an afternoon in 19h8 with Wm. H. Jackson

Personnel the ief Difficulty

This meant to me that the quarreling of the previous year went on and on. Babbitt would have had to dismiss some of his subordinates

We talked at length about the section in the Comments by

to stop it.

"OHE " on the ulles Report ORE upon the Dulles Report, pages 6-7, concerning the Estimates

Division and the Research and Reports Division. This section was

used by Hillenkoetter in the Comments of the Agency on mage 2. Montarue explained the discussion within OTE in which he took

strong exception to the position of the Office. He said that I

should get Lewis Stevens' original draft. It would show, in com-

parison with the Report of the Office and the Comments of the

Agency, how Stevens and Babbitt held to their position with regard

to the necessity of research divisions in the Office. In this


whole controversy is, of course, the ceaseless friction between

the Geographical Branches and the Estimating Croup (the old Intelligence Staff).

During this conversation I asked that we set aside the politics and other factors of the mount and discuss on its murits whether as estimating staff needed to have a research group within

Necessity for Research

Divisions



if the departmental intelligence agencies purveyed their materials, the product of their our research, to the estimating group in the agency. He said that they were doing so fairly well today for Old. But he said also that, of course, the estimating group needed to have a scall staff of researchers immediately available. For one obvious reason, this is necessary to save time in case some one of the estimators wishes to have the information before him verified or medified by other factors, suspect or known.

its own organization. I gathered that Monta as thought it unaccessary

Montague did not think that ORP had to be in this ligency. It could be, he said, another agency provided that its materials were immediately available. In short, ORP did not have to be under the administration of CIA.

establishing ONE in the first place (summer of 1946). Montague remarked that Vandenberg had other reasons besides those which he specified, but Montague did not indicate them. From my mamory of what Vandenberg said to me, I concluded that he was having great difficulty in persuading the departmental a encies to send their information to the Group. Today, said Eontague, there was much more "cooperation." Possibly it was to be ascribed to General Smith's genius. I was inclined to think that his rank also had something to do with it. Montague spoke often of the Datimates Production Board. It apparently was established, December 27, 1959, as a result of the Dulles Report. I was not sufficiently informed

Vandenberg's Establishment of "ORE"

"OIE" and

"OPP"

Jenius and Fank

Smith's

and Rank



about it to understand all that he said. At the moment it seemed to me that it was the proceedsor of OPE within the jurisdiction of ORE.


The Eberstadt Report

decommendation of an Intelligence Evaluation Board

ersonalities , and Argument He did not recall ever having seen a copy. I showed him the one which Todd sent to the agency in December 19h6; particularly the recommendation (p. h9) that there should be an Intelligence Evaluation Board. This, I said, looked to me very much like. Montague's own suggestion in the spring of 19h6. He said that it saymed as to him. I asked if he knew why the Eberstadt Report had been kept in the shadow as it were of the Dulles Report which followed it and which quoted it with respect to a "civilian DCI." It seemed to me that the findings of the Eberstadt Report were as significant; they might well have had some influence upon Smith, Lanser, and others who initiated the reforms after General Smith became DCI. Tontague was interested in the idea but did not know much about the Eberstadt Commission and Report.

There was no time to ask questions about scientific intelligence, Louis Johnson as Secretary of Schense, the Leve Plan, and many other things which I wanted to discuss with him. Je continued our talk at lunch on lesser matters. One major point lontance stressed again and again as a matter of practical politics. Personalities entered constantly into an argument. If a certain person supported the measure, you could expect half a dozen others to line up a sinst him. If one's "rice bowl? were in





One's "Rice Howl"

danger of being shattered, he said, ou could count upon that person to make sturdy and often in enious arguments for maintaining the organization. He said that I should talk with Van Slyck about the Special Staff which Babbitt created to handle "Korea."
Wentague himself was on duty in the Pentagon at that time.